Evolutionary psychology emerged from sociobiology in the s and s as psychologists adopted Darwinian and neo-Darwinian concepts, most notably natural selection, to explain human behavior from a functional, or adaptationist, perspective. Most evolutionary psychologists also adopted Richard Dawkins'  gene's-eye-view of evolution, which gave the impression to many developmentalists of genetic determinism, an anathema to DS advocates.
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DS theory in psychology traces its roots to early developmental psychobiologists such as Schneirla , Kuo , and Lehrman , and most recently Gottlieb [, , ] and his theory of probabilistic epigenesis. The theorizing of philosophers such as Griffiths and Gray [, ] and Oyama [, ] has also been influential. For DS theorists, nothing is preformed; structure and organization emerge via the bidirectional transaction of ingredients at all levels of organization, from DNA through culture.
Somewhat ironically perhaps, the hard DS approach replaces the organism with DS as the principal focus of natural selection, much as Richard Dawkins  replaced the organism with the gene in his selfish gene theory.
In both cases, the organism is no longer a theoretically important entity in evolution [Pradeu, ]. Witherington and Lickliter present a well-researched and scholarly paper, first reviewing the central tenets of EDP, which purports to integrate Darwinian evolutionary theory with DS theory. The authors claim that developmental and evolutionary perspectives are ontologically incompatible and only a revolutionarily new model will be able to provide an adequate integration of evolution and development, one that focuses on formal and final causation rather than efficient causation.
At one level, I can find little to object to in Witherington and Lickliter's thorough review and theoretical presentation. I believe they present a fair and mostly accurate description of EDP's attempted integration of evolution and development and the differences in how EDP views DS theory and their own view of DS shared by others such as Lerner and Overton. This is all well and good and should be read by anyone interested in the integration of evolution and psychological development.
However, the shortcoming of their approach, I believe, is their view that they are advocating the DS theory, and that the perspective taken by EDP is not only different from their own, but also conceptually wrongheaded and simply incorrect. Witherington and Lickliter acknowledge that variation does exist among DS theorists [Oyama, ], but such acceptable variation does not extend to the variant of DS theory proposed by EDP theorists. All DS theorists view the interaction or transaction of ingredients at all levels of organization, from genes through culture, as producing emergent structure and function in development.
Genes are merely part of complex DS, a necessary but not sufficient component for development. Individuals inherit not only a species-typical genome and epigenome, but also a species-typical environment, which, in interaction, produce usually species-typical morphology and behavior. With respect to evolution, development provides the creative force for phenotypic novelties, and what evolved are DS of which genes are only a part.
Within this emergent system of bidirectional effects, at least two major types of DS theory exist [see Frankenhuis et al.
The organism cannot be separated from the environment, making adaptation by natural selection at the level of the organism impossible. The whole organism is the focus of selection pressures, thus making an adaptationist approach viable. This does not mean that organisms are independent of their environments. They clearly are not, yet, for theoretical purposes, they can be treated as distinct aspects in evolutionary models.
EDP approaches adopt an explicitly soft version of DS theory [e. They adhere to a neo-Darwinian adaptationist perspective, providing a developmental theory soft DS that can be integrated with evolutionary theory to provide a metatheory for developmental psychology. EDP theorists propose that infants are not born as blank slates but enter the world with, or develop early, behavioral, perceptual, and cognitive biases or constraints that affect how they process information.
Developmental psychobiology - Wikipedia
Geary [, ] has referred to these as skeletal competencies, which are fleshed out in development mainly through play. In other words, infants and children are prepared by natural selection to selectively process some information in the evolutionarily relevant domains of folk psychology, folk biology, and folk physics. But prepared is not preformed [Bjorklund, ]. Rather, patterns of behavior and cognition emerge via the interaction of these low-level competencies and environment to produce usually adaptive behavior. A central tenet of mainstream evolutionary psychology is that what evolved are information-processing mechanisms evolved cognitive mechanisms.
Yet, a missing component in evolutionary psychology's concept of evolved cognitive mechanism is development, which evolved probabilistic cognitive mechanisms address.
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Bjorklund et al. In conclusion, the present work will provide a contribution toward the possible dissolution of the nature-nurture dichotomy, as well as a contribution to evolutionary theory. Toon meer Toon minder. Reviews Schrijf een review. Kies je bindwijze. Verwacht over 6 weken Levertijd We doen er alles aan om dit artikel op tijd te bezorgen. Verkoop door bol.
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get link In striving to offer a straightforward historical exposition of the complex topic of nature and nurture, the author tells the story through a central cast of characters beginning with Lamarck in and ending with a synthesis of his own that depicts how extragenetic behavioral changes in individual development could be the first stages in the pathway leading to evolutionary change. On the way to that goal, he describes relevant conceptual aspects of genetics, embryological development, and evolutionary biology in a nontechnical and accurate way for students and colleagues in the behavioral and social sciences.
The book presents a highly selected review as a prelude to the description of a developmental theory of the phenotype in which behavioral change leads eventually to evolutionary change.